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Abstract 
 The development of market and fair competition is based on the 
protection of individuals’ rights including shareholders’ rights. The interests 
of investors are ensured by solid legal guarantee. It is however important to 
keep in mind that the important goal of drawing the attention of investors 
should not jeopardize the rights of minority shareholders. Shareholders’ 
rights drew the attention of scholars from the very beginning. Despite the 
efforts of numerous authors, development of case-law and several legal 
reforms, the way to solve the difficulty that arose due to contradiction 
between the interests of those two groups – minority and majority 
shareholders – is still missing. After “velvet revolution”, in an attempt to 
create an attractive environment for foreign investors, Georgian legislators 
went overboard and broke the balance at minority shareholders stake. It is 
very important to finally find the right balance to protect both groups and 
also to ensure the normal functioning of the company. The article is focused 
on the identification of the main problems of the protection of shareholders’ 
rights in Georgian legislation and court practice. It overviews the legal model 
of regulation and outlines the directions of the necessary legislative reforms. 
The deficiencies that violate minority shareholders’ rights on legislation 
level by setting unclear and unbalanced procedures were sorted out. The 
article also offers general directions of legal amendments which are 
necessary to eliminate flaws in Georgian legislation and court practices.  
 
Keywords: Shareholders’ rights, Protection of Minority Shareholders 
 
Introduction 
The pre-requisite for the development of market and fair competition 
is the protection of individuals’ rights including shareholders’ rights. The 
interests of investors are ensured by solid legal guarantees. It is however 
important to keep in mind that the interest of drawing the attention of large 
investors should not jeopardize the rights of minority shareholders. 
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 Shareholders’ rights drew attention of scholars from the very 
beginning. Despite the efforts of numerous authors, development of case-law 
and several legal reforms, the way to solve the difficulty that arose due to the 
contradiction between the interests of those two groups – minority and 
majority shareholders –  is still missing (Poisson, 1994, 1-2). “Striking the 
right balance between the interests of minority/majority shareholders or, in 
other categories, interests of minority shareholders and facilitation of the 
efficient takeover market, is one of the most troublesome tasks for the 
legislature and the judiciary in dealing with the squeeze-out cases”( Miliutis, 
2013, 770).  
 After “velvet revolution” in an attempt to create an attractive 
environment for foreign investors, Georgian legislators went overboard and 
broke the balance at minority shareholders stake. It is true that the decision 
of the constitutional court of Georgia that declared the first redaction of 
mandatory acquisition of shares anticonstitutional had a slight impact to slow 
down this process. It also aims to make legislative bodies to keep in mind 
minority shareholders’ rights as well. Nevertheless, the results were not 
comforting.      
 The article is focused on the identification of the main problems of 
the protection of shareholders’ rights in Georgian legislation and court 
practice, overviews the legal model of regulation, and outlines the directions 
of necessary legislative reforms. The deficiencies that violate minority 
shareholders’ rights on legislation level by setting unclear and unbalanced 
procedures for the compensation of the restriction of their property rights 
were sorted out. Therefore, the article also offers general directions of legal 
amendments that are necessary to eliminate flaws mentioned above. 
 The research is based on general scientific methodology. Abstractive-
logical methodology is broadly used which includes analysis and synthesis, 
induction and deduction. Comparative legal methodology of research was 
also applied. 
 The article consists of six main chapters, where all the important 
issues in the process of protection of shareholder’s rights are discussed. In 
the conclusion, the results of the research are summarized and necessary 
recommendations for further development of the topic are provided. 
   
Shareholders’ Rights and Obligations and their Classification 
 It is declared that shareholder’s sole obligation is to make transition. 
Consequently, the spectrum of shareholder’s rights that is declared by all 
legal systems in one way or another includes the following: 
• Right to dividends; 
• Right to attend general meeting and vote; 
• Right to demand early general meeting; 
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• Access to information; 
• Opportunity to Inspect Corporate Books and Records; 
• The Right to Sue for Wrongful Acts. 
 Traditionally, shareholders’ rights are divided into managerial and 
economic rights. Recently in Georgian legal doctrine, a new system of 
classification was offered as an analogy of Germany. According to this 
system, shareholders’ rights are divided into individual and based on 
percentage rights; general meeting related rights and rights independent from 
general meeting; special rights and based on membership rights (Burduli 
Irakli, 2013, 40). The article offers new criteria of classification of 
shareholders’ rights. It is considered appropriate to classify those rights into 
three main groups: Managerial rights, Property rights, and Protective rights. 
Managerial rights are subdivided into two subcategories: general meeting 
related rights and rights independent from general meeting. It seems slightly 
unclear of the reasons to indicate ‘based on membership rights’ as a separate 
group. Furthermore, all shareholder rights and obligations are based on 
holding shares in a company and do not exist separately, although some 
rights follow their owner even after the transfer of ownership of shares (right 
to receive dividends, non-concurrency rules, obligation to keep 
confidentiality). Nevertheless, they still originated from the fact of being a 
partner in a company. In addition, being based on membership is a 
characteristic of all shareholders’ rights and not a separate group. 
 Before discussing each group of rights closely, it is appropriate to 
analyze the legal nature of stocks. The stock in its pure legal nature is a non-
material property - right of demand. The rights and obligations that emerge 
from the ownership of shares have their legal scope. The most important 
amongst them is the right to dividends. The other managerial or protective 
rights stand to ensure and empower partner’s right to dividends.  
 Except for entitlement to dividends, the stocks are primarily 
connected to voting rights. Generally, different classes of stocks establish 
different rights. The aim of emission of differently classed shares is to 
control who holds voting rights. Georgian legislation directly acknowledges 
only two main classes of shares: common and preferred. The international 
market is familiar with three more classes of stocks that neither Georgian 
legislation nor practice has accepted yet. The classification of stocks is a 
good way to control shareholders’ rights within the company, to limit voting 
rights of target groups and, if necessary, to ensure investors have their 
entitlement to dividends without transferring managerial powers. Preferred 
stock represents some degree of ownership in a company, but usually does 
not come with the same voting rights. With preferred shares, investors are 
usually guaranteed a fixed dividend. Recall that this is different from that of 
common stock, which has variable dividend payments that fluctuate with 
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company profits. Unlike common stock, preferred stock doesn’t usually 
enjoy the same appreciation (or depreciation in market downturns) in stock 
price, which results in lower overall returns. One advantage of preferred 
stock is that in the event of bankruptcy, preferred shareholders are paid off 
before the common shareholder. Sadly, this mechanism of solving problem is 
completely ignored by Joint Stock Companies (JSC) in Georgia.  
 
Managerial Rights 
 The group of managerial rights include the following rights that are 
connected with the management of the company, decision-making, and 
controlling managerial bodies: the right to attend general meeting, voting 
rights, the right to demand early general meeting, the right to obtain 
information, preemptive right of acquisition of stocks, and opportunity to 
inspect corporate books and records.  
 The right to demand early general meeting, preemptive right to 
acquire stocks, and the right to inspect corporate books and records are 
dependent on the percentage of shares. Georgian legislation does not contain 
any specific or problematic rule concerning those rights. 
 Without providing shareholders’ with information, their participation 
in general meeting will not be efficient. Shareholder ought to be regularly 
updated with information concerning important tendencies taking place in 
the company (Tsertsvadze Lasha, 2016, 78). The access to information on 
one hand is an important tool to protect minority shareholders, while on the 
other hand, the access to information contains several risks like the abuse of 
one’s rights. In some cases, a shareholder owns stocks in other company 
which might even be concurring with the first company. In this situation, 
providing a shareholder with confidential details of upcoming bargain or the 
transaction in force might be risky and result to the leaking of information. 
Shareholder is entitled to address a court in case of the refusal in sharing the 
information. The court must be very careful while delivering justice and 
expel the risk of abuse of rights before putting obligation to share requested 
information on directors of the company.    
 It is quite unusual for Georgian shareholders to suits on directors’ 
refusal based on access to information. Preserving ‘happy medium’ by the 
court in that kind of cases is crucially important to protect minority 
shareholders efficiently and to prevent the abuse of rights. For the sake of 
efficiency, it is important that time required to deal with this kind of suits 
was diminished to minimum, since it is vital to receive information on time 
and not to give a dominant shareholder an opportunity to destroy important 
evidences. For this purpose, if required, the decision of first instance court 
must be enforced immediately. On the other hand, court must rule out all the 
possibilities of wrongful usage of information and leaking confidential data 
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against corporate interests. Of course, as in every civil case, the burden of 
proof lays on parties.  
 While speaking of shareholders’ managerial rights, the proposition of 
French’s corporate researcher, Marie-Danielle Poisson, must be considered. 
Prof. Poisson offers to engage minority shareholders into controlling bodies 
of the company (Poisson, 1994, 654). As Georgia recognizes two-tiered 
board system with board of directors and supervisory board separately, it 
should be in the very best interests of fair balance to appoint minority 
shareholder or a representative of such a group in supervisory board of JSC. 
The obligation to elect minority shareholders into the board must be declared 
by legislation and should not depend on the decision of corporate managers. 
 
Property Rights 
 The main property rights of shareholders are preemptive right of 
acquisition of stocks and entitlement to dividends. 
 As mentioned above, preemptive right of acquisition of stocks is a 
percentage-related right. According to article 53 of Entrepreneurs Law of 
Georgia (EL), in case of the emission of new stocks by the company, all the 
shareholders have preemptive right of acquisition. However, the board is 
obliged to inform in person only shareholders who own at least 1% of voting 
stocks of the company. For the rest of the shareholders, making a public 
announcement is sufficient.  
 The right of dividends depends on both the percentage and 
classification of shares, as mentioned above. Concerning the entitlement to 
dividends, The Supreme Court of Georgia established common practice few 
years ago. According to clarifications of the Supreme Court, the share in the 
capital, owned by the partner of the company, is the right to demand 
economical and legal benefits, of which the right of dividends is the most 
important. The Court of Cassation distinguished the general right to receive 
dividends and the right to demand allotted portion of income at the end of an 
economic year – the right to demand dividends. The difference between them 
is that the general right of dividends originates as soon as a person acquires 
stocks of the company i.e. becomes the partner or shareholder. On the other 
hand, the right to demand dividends is granted to a shareholder after general 
meeting in making a decision on the marshalling of income between 
shareholders. In other words, the entitlement to dividends is a right 
dependent on the decision of general meeting. General right of dividends is 
linked with stocks and cannot be transferred separately from shares to 
another person (Decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia, 2011). The right 
to demand dividends can be applied even after the transition of stocks by 
former shareholder if it is stated that the decision of general meeting to 
divide income as dividends was made at the end of the economic year and 
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given the fact that shareholder did not receive his lot. This kind of misuse of 
power by majority of shareholders happened quite often in Georgia during 
the past 20 years. Several cases were discussed by Georgian courts where 
single shareholder or the group of majority shareholders had held general 
meeting without inviting minority shareholders. Also, they had made 
decisions to split income into dividends among themselves. Thus, majority 
of them were simply deceived that there was no income to share as 
dividends. As soon as those abused shareholders found out about the breach 
of their rights and brought actions against companies and majority, the court 
granted them their portion of dividends.  
 The situation is completely different in cases where general meeting 
has not made the decision on marshalling income. The common practice is 
established that courts are not empowered to force corporate management to 
distribute dividends. No matter how unreasonable the decision of non-
distribution of dividends is, only corporate bodies are entitled to make this 
kind of decision. However, it could be quite harmful to force JSC to use the 
income for dividends. It is presumed that managerial bodies of the company 
act in the best interest of JSC. Making the decision on how to marshal 
income is a great risk which is not justified even by the purpose of protection 
of minority shareholders. Of course, in case of abuse of power, the minority 
shareholders are granted the right to demand fair compensation from 
dominant partner directly.   
 
Protective Rights 
 Under protective rights, the article unites the mechanisms that 
minority and majority shareholders have against each other. These 
mechanisms are: right to demand compensation of damage, mandatory 
acquisition of shares, mandatory tender offer, and shareholders’ lawsuit.   
 To ensure normal activity of the company, it is of vital importance to 
keep minority and majority shareholders interests balanced. The system of 
protection of shareholders’ rights is based on the presumption that majority 
of shareholders have in mind the interest of the company. Since they make 
bold investments, they are more interested in further development of the 
company. The majority risks more than minority and the sole interest of the 
minority shareholders’ is to get dividends. The presumption seems slightly 
outdated in modern world. First, to maximize income is in the best interests 
of the both groups. Further development of business, widening the space in 
the market at the end equals to more profit. At least, one of the European 
researches considers this presumption as obsolete (Thamm, 2013). The 
author indicates more involvement of the minority shareholders in the 
process of managing company in Germany. Hence, the situation has not 
improved that much in Georgia.  
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 As mentioned above, the reform of EL was carried out to ensure 
comfortable environment for foreign investors. During the process, several 
legal amendments were made. For example, first, the complete antitrust 
regulations were taken down. Simultaneously, new Labor Code of Georgia 
was passed. The Code authorized an employer to terminate contract with an 
employee at any time without prior notice or giving any reasons. The 
amendments of EL were made with the same attitude. Thus, mandatory 
tender offer and first redaction of mandatory acquisition of shares were 
introduced in 2007. The main purpose of the adoption of the so called 
‘squeeze-out’ was to liberate potential investors or other majority 
shareholders from post-soviet burden of former employees of factories and 
mills transformed into minority shareholders. In several months, The 
Constitutional Court of Georgia declared the institution of mandatory 
acquisition of shares anticonstitutional and void, but meanwhile minority 
shareholders of several large companies were effectively ‘squeezed-out’. In 
2008, new redaction of mandatory acquisition of shares was adopted. It 
supposedly was based on the decision of the Constitutional Court of Georgia, 
but not all of the recommendations of the court were taken into account. The 
institution of mandatory tender offer was not amended since 2007. 
 The approach is different with mandatory tender offer and mandatory 
acquisition of shares. Mandatory tender offer still leaves the chance to 
minority shareholders to reject tender offer if the redemption price is 
inappropriate. This conclusion is made on the basis of the article 15.3 of the 
Law on Security Market (LSM) according to which “all proposals or 
recommendations […] on acceptance or repudiation of tender offer, as well 
as tender offer, must be conducted in accordance with regulations established 
by National Bank of Georgia.” Since Entrepreneurs law of Georgia (EL) 
refers to LSM, the article 15.3 must be applied in case of mandatory tender 
offer (Burduli Irakli, 2007, 24). 
 Article 532 of EL regulates mandatory tender offers. One of the 
aspects of takeover is that buyer must offer fair price for the shares to 
minority shareholders. 
 Based on the article 532.2 of EL, the main principles of the 
redemption of shares could be highlighted: 
• The price must be fair; 
• The definition of fair price is not established by legislation; 
• Price is evaluated by auditor or brokerage; 
• The minimal price is established by EL which equals to the 
maximum price of the share for the past six months.  
 The problem with this regulation is that minority shareholders have 
no option to bargain and argue the established price. It is not comforting that 
EL establishes minimal price of redeeming shares, since this price equals to 
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maximum price of the share for the past six months. Squeeze-outs are 
usually associated with a preceding low market flee-float, which affects the 
price of shares. Even though EL refers to “minimal price”, in reality this is 
the only approach of the calculation of fair price that is offered by Georgian 
legislation or doctrine in contrast with the experience of European countries 
(Germany and Austria, for example) where several methodologies of 
evaluation are set in place and often applied simultaneously (Dollinger, 
2008). 
 Next problem is that assessment is delegated to audits or brokerage 
firms, while brokerage is completely underdeveloped in Georgia. I am 
inclined to agree with the position offered in Georgian legal doctrine, which 
considers the possibility for the minority shareholders to address the court if 
they don’t consent with offered tender price. Article 531.6 of EL must be 
applied in that case (legal analogy) (Burduli Irakli, 2007, 24-25). Also, it is 
still unclear what part the court system will play in the establishment fair 
price. Price of the share, itself, is not a legal category. Also, evaluation 
requires special knowledge which brings the necessity of expert conclusion. 
Some legal precision on the methods of evaluation is still necessary.  
 The institution of mandatory acquisition of shares is easily the most 
widely discussed institution in corporate law domain. From the very 
beginning, it was discussed and questioned whether this form of compulsory 
contracting was against freedom of property. Finally, it was agreed that since 
minority shareholders were offered fair prices, the restriction of their 
property was duly compensated and, therefore, valid.  
 The approach is much stricter in case of mandatory acquisition of 
shares. Article  534.2 of EL states that The court shall decide on a mandatory 
acquisition of shares as determined in the Civil Procedure Code of Georgia. 
The fair value and the date of share redemption would be fixed by the court 
decision on a mandatory acquisition of shares as determined in the Civil 
Procedure Code of Georgia (CPC). 
 It is important to keep in mind that first redaction of mandatory 
selling out of shares was declared void by Constitutional Court of Georgia. 
Basic argument was that the law did not ensure offering fair price to minority 
shareholders. Constitutional court supported the idea of evaluating shares by 
independent brokerage companies or experts. Nonetheless, it is still doubtful 
whether the procedure adopted after the decision of the Constitutional Court 
guarantees necessary protection to minority shareholders and assures them of 
due compensation for the restriction of their property. 
 Though EL declares boldly that court fixes fair price, the appropriate 
articles of CPC and practice gave a different impression. 
 Article 30912 (1-2) of CPC declares that to determine the fair 
redemption price of the shares, the court shall appoint an independent expert 
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or a broker company within seven days after an application has been filed. 
An independent expert or a broker company shall prepare a redemption 
report that shall include documented circumstances of redemption as well as 
the method to be used for determining a fair redemption price of the shares 
and the price of the shares determined on that basis. The costs of an 
independent expert or a broker company shall be borne by the offeror. 
 The participation of parties is ensured only on the level of 
appointment of expert or brokerage. When selecting an independent expert 
or a broker company, the court may take into account the opinions of the 
parties. The parties may recommend to the court candidates to be appointed 
as experts. The final decision as to who is to prepare a redemption report 
shall be made by the court. The parties may challenge an independent expert 
or a broker company.  
 CPC does not grant the possibility of disputing offered price or 
representation of alternative evaluation to minority shareholders. In fact, 
court makes decision based on the evaluation provided under the Article 
30912. Therefore, article 30914 CPC states that when establishing a fair price 
for redemption of shares, a court shall take into account: 
a) the value of these shares on the stock market; 
b) estimated revenues that the joint stock company may expect to gain in the 
future; 
c) assets (including reserves, goodwill, experience, prospects and business 
relationships of the enterprise) and liabilities of the joint stock company. 
 CPC does not state based on which data court should enquire these 
measures. As already mentioned, those criteria are not legal and it requires 
special knowledge. Basically, court completely relies on the assessment of 
expert or broker.  
 Generally, no legal system establishes how fair price should be 
calculated, but several approaches are elaborated in case law. According to 
German practice, bottom value of redemption is the market value of the 
stock (Krebs, 2008, 961). Basically, same position was held by Delaware 
courts (Miliutis, 2013). Also, it is still a subject of discussion—should the 
valuation be based on the company value or on the value of the specific 
minority shares? Should the minority shareholders be benefitting from the 
transactions? In the theory, the opinion was raised that stocks should not be 
evaluated separately because the value of each stock could be different. This 
would infringe on the rule of equal treatment of all shareholders (Krebs, 
2008, 964). Delaware case law stated that a fixed sum must be added to the 
evaluation of independent appraiser, considering the fact that the value of 
stock was reduced by the lack of controlling rights. This approach is widely 
criticized and believed to overcompensate minority shareholders (Miliutis, 
2013, 786). 
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 Most common approaches of evaluation price of the stock are: 
a. By market value; this means to compensate stocks according to 
market value of the stock in a given moment.  This approach is not beneficial 
to minority shareholders as market value in a given moment of time might 
not reflect the real value of the shares. Naturally, Majority shareholders will 
choose the moment to buy out when the market price is the lowest (Miliutis, 
2013, 780). 
b. Third party sale value which means to establish the value of stock in 
accordance with the price payed in previous transactions. This approach is 
rejected by Delaware courts. The risk of this approach is that potential 
investor might be encouraged to reduce artificially the price of stocks 
(Miliutis, 2013, 782).  
c. Going concern value. This method is one of the mostly accepted and 
it demonstrates that under appropriate management, the going concern value 
would have been equal or higher than the company’s assets value.  
d. The ‘block approach’ or ‘multi-criterion approach’ generally refers to 
the technique, which calculates the fair price of a squeeze-out by arithmetical 
or  weighted average of different multiples, e.g. market price, value of 
company’s assets, past earnings, etc. It is interesting to note that Delaware 
case law declares block approach as outdated (Miliutis, 2013, 784). 
 Georgian legislation is dubious somehow. CPC does not limit 
brokerage or expert and does not state which method must be applied to 
calculate fair price. However, article 309.14 is based on ‘block approach’. 
CPC does not state based on which data should court enquire those 
indicators. There are several unanswered questions like if the expertise is 
carried out using different methodology, and how is the court supposed to 
get required information? Should the court itself request those materials from 
the company? General principles of Civil Procedure deprive courts this 
privilege and, also, has already mentioned these indicators as illegal and 
require special knowledge. The question is who must systemize the 
information for the court’s use? What is the chance that dominating 
stakeholder will provide full information? Unfortunately, the answers are not 
offered by the case law either. Few decisions of Tbilisi city and Appeal 
Courts that are available on these matters, provided no groundings and only 
declared that the offered price is fair.        
 As for the Expert conclusion, generally, under CPC, all parties enjoy 
the possibility to challenge any proof provided by opponent party and 
represent alternative expert conclusion or evaluation. They are entitled to 
request additional or repeated expertise, while in the process of hearing cases 
on compulsory acquisition of shares, parties lack those options. The 
restriction of adversarial principle is inappropriate. Of course, the fact that 
those procedures are monitored by court is a much better regulation. Thus, 
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the interests of parties are not sufficiently protected and by “parties” both - 
the offeror and minority shareholders are meant, since broker might suggest 
risen or diminished redemption for shares.   
 The research shows that mandatory acquisition of shares requires 
several amendments. First of all, the ‘take-over directive’, from which 
Georgian legislator got an idea of squeeze-out, also includes alternative, 
equal right – mandatory sell-out of shares. It is the minority shareholders 
right to demand sell-out of shares and set themselves free from JSC. 
Georgian legislator left minority shareholders without this minimal 
protection. 
 It is quite important that case-law of Delaware state introduced 
business purpose tests when dealing with freeze-out mergers. In case of 
Singer v. Magnavox, the court stated that a merger could not be effected for 
the sole purpose of freezing-out minority shareholders (Krebs, 2008, 355). 
 The Constitutional Court of Georgia while dealing with ‘freeze-out’ 
stated that the desire of majority shareholder to own all the shares is only 
natural and understandable, but does not justify the restriction of property 
rights. Simply the fact that one of the shareholders holds 95% or more does 
not raise the social necessity of the acquisition of shares. The right of 
Mandatory acquisition of shares exists only when it is an absolute necessity 
for normal development and function of the company (Decision of the 
Constitutional Court of Georgia N2/1-370,382,390,402,405).  
 Therefore, the Constitutional Court supported the idea that mandatory 
acquisition or sell-out of shares (which is not nearly as strong restriction of 
property rights as squeeze-out) must be used only in those cases when 
justified. Unfortunately, the position of the Constitutional Court of Georgia 
was not taken into account when new redaction of squeeze-out was passed.  
 
Shareholders’ Action 
 Within the scope of protective rights, shareholders’ lawsuit (action) is 
the most important right. The right to sue for the wrongful actions is a 
mechanism of protection of shareholder’s interests when other rights are in 
peril of breach or already affected.  
 Shareholders’ action is divided into two categories: direct lawsuit and 
derivative lawsuit. It is of vital importance to distinguish these two 
categories since not only do they serve different purposes and cause different 
results, but also the procedure and allocation of burden of proof are 
completely different. 
 The primary beneficiary of direct lawsuit is a shareholder himself, 
while the derivative lawsuit is brought on behalf of the company. Direct 
lawsuit is brought when shareholder considers that one of his rights was 
limited or he suffered damage by the breach of fiduciary duties or by abuse 
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of power by the dominant shareholder.  The burden of proof is divided 
between parties usually. The derivative lawsuit is brought when the company 
has a claim against third party, but is not using itself. If the claim is satisfied 
the company gets profit. The shareholder might only be an indirect 
beneficiary and also the other shareholders who haven’t brought derivative 
lawsuit might equally benefit from the outcome of the court decision.  In this 
sense, derivative lawsuit is a kind of action popularis. The mandatory pre-
request is that company itself is not bringing charges against third party. 
Direct actions are not brought against third parties and respondents are other 
shareholders, directors, or dominant partner.        
 The Common law system gave birth to derivative lawsuit. In the UK, 
derivative lawsuits can be tracked down in some decisions from 19th century 
(16, 2). In one of the earliest cases, Carlen v. Drury, the possibility of partner 
to bring suit instead of company was dismissed, but in following decade, 
gradually the action on behalf of the company was allowed.   
 Georgian court practice is not rich in this kind of actions. To be fair, 
derivative actions are not quite that a popular remedy elsewhere. Four main 
problems to blame are: a) the damage is not made directly to shareholder and 
the shareholder is not interested to act instead of company; b) positive 
outcome is highly questionable—It is quite difficult to prove that bringing 
charges against third party is in the best interest of the company while 
managerial bodies claim otherwise; c) Burden of proof lies on the plaintiff 
shareholder; d) derivative actions have bad impact on companies’ reputation 
and make investors more reluctant to deal with those companies.  
 
Fiduciary Duties and Obligation to Compensate Damage 
 When fiduciary duties are touched, most of the time, the directors and 
other managerial bodies are in mind and it is forgotten that shareholders also 
have equivalent fiduciary duties, especially dominant shareholder, the one 
who has possibility to influence the outcome of general meeting.  The 
‘supreme’ managerial body of JSC is a general meeting. Therefore, 
shareholders who have influence on the results of votes are subjects of 
fiduciary duties. It is debatable whether minority shareholders have fiduciary 
duties or not. For instance, German case-law states that minority 
shareholders have no such obligations. 
 To solve the question, it is important to keep in mind that dominant 
shareholder is not always a majority shareholder. In some situations, 
minority shareholders have power to influence decision-making processes. 
Therefore, they are also subjects of fiduciary duties. The statement is 
especially true in the case of so called ‘dead-lock’.   The article 8 and 115 of 
Civil Code of Georgia must also be used in such cases. The article 3.8 of EL 
European Scientific Journal November 2017 edition Vol.13, No.31 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
76 
states that dominant shareholder is obliged to pay due compensation to other 
shareholders in case of abuse of dominant position.  
 
Conclusion 
 At the end, it is possible to determine several legal-practical 
amendments that will help in the process of protection of minority 
shareholders. 
 First of all, it is necessary that monitoring of redemption of shares 
was delegated to courts in the process of mandatory tender offers; for 
example, it is established by Austrian legislation. 
 The squeeze-out requires further legal amendments. First and 
foremost, the institution of mandatory sell-out of stocks must be 
implemented in Georgian legislation. Secondly, it is highly important to 
ensure that the recommendation of the Constitutional Court of Georgia is 
preserved and legislative frame for squeeze-out was set in place. Contrary to 
the statement of Constitutional Court of Georgia, amended institution of 
mandatory acquisition of shares does not set a prerequisite that acquisition or 
sell-out of shares might be initiated only for legitimate purposes and only in 
case when the necessity of squeeze-out is justified to preserve corporate 
interests or better protect minority shareholders’ rights. Mandatory 
acquisition or sell-out of shares is justified only in those cases when it serves 
legal purposes and is a proportionate restriction of property rights in the light 
of necessity to better preserve corporate interests or ensure minority 
shareholders’ interests.   
 It is inevitable to establish some approaches of evaluation of fair 
price at least by case law. The Approach of Delaware courts states that a 
fixed sum must be added to the evaluation of independent appraiser. 
Although this practice is criticized and believed to overcompensate minority 
shareholders, it is important to keep in mind that shareholders are not giving 
up the belongings that have fixed market value. However, they are deprived 
of the set of rights and obligations, the possibility of receiving stable income 
included, that come as a package with the possession of shares. Furthermore, 
the moral aspects of the transactions must be noted: the weaker party of the 
obligation is unwillingly giving up the property to meet the interests of other 
private person. Also, slight unbalance in favor of minority shareholders is 
admissible and appropriate. 
 The chapter of CPC dealing with mandatory acquisition of shares 
must be amended and must not restrict such elements of adversarial principle 
as possibility to provide proofs, to request alternative, repeated or additional 
expertise.  
 Currently, it is not advisable to delegate evaluation to broker 
companies as brokerage is not properly evaluated in Georgia.  
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 Georgian legislation acknowledges only two classes of stocks. The 
international market knows several classes of shares. The emission of 
different shares is a good way to control participation in decision-making 
process. The several forms of preferred shares allow investors interests to 
move into dividends without transmission of managerial rights. It is 
important to encourage usage of this measure by appropriate legal 
amendments.  
 Georgian legislation does not include shareholders agreement as a 
best way to protect minority and majority shareholders interests and provide 
solution for every possible conflict of interests.  
 Finally, it is very important to adopt the principle of mandatory 
participation of minority shareholders into controlling bodies of JSC. In the 
case of Georgia, the representatives of minority shareholders should be 
nominated into the board of supervisors.   
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